S____________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SAFEWAY, INC.,
Petitioner and Defendant,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY,
Respondent,
KATHLEEN HARDIN and DANE HARDIN,
Real Parties in Interest and Plaintiffs
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
KATHLEEN HARDIN’S AND DANE HARDIN’S
PETITION FOR REVIEW

After a Decision by the Court of Appeal,
First Appellate District, Division Three
Case No. A141505

DAVID B. NEWDORF, State Bar No. 172960
RYE P. MURPHY, State Bar No. 289427
NEWDORF LEGAL
220 Montgomery Street, Suite 1850
San Francisco, California 94104
Telephone: (415) 357-1234
E-Mail:
nl@newdorf.com

NANCY HERSH, State Bar No. 49091
KATE HERSH-BOYLE, State Bar No. 278864
HERSH & HERSH
A Professional Corporation
601 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 2080
San Francisco, California 94102
Telephone: (415) 441-5544

Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest
Kathleen Hardin and Dane Hardin

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... iii
ISSUE PRESENTED .................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 1
WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED ................................................. 3
BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 5
A.

The Drug Information that Safeway, Inc.
Provided to Mrs. Hardin Did Not Warn Her of
the Serious Risks Associated with Lamotrigine. ......... 5

B.

Three Weeks After Starting the Drug, Mrs.
Hardin Was Hospitalized with a Severe Case of
Stevens-Johnson Syndrome Caused by
Lamotrigine.................................................................. 7

C.

Safeway, Inc. Corporate Headquarters Decided
to Modify Its Software so that the Safeway
Pharmacies Would Only Print Abbreviated
Monographs. ................................................................ 7

D.

The Decision to Use Abbreviated Monographs
Was Made by the Safeway, Inc. Corporate
Executive Responsible for the Profitability of
the Pharmacies Nationwide. ...................................... 10

LEGAL DISCUSSION ............................................................................... 12
THE PURPOSE OF A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER’S ACT OR
OMISSION MAY BE HIGHLY RELEVANT TO WHETHER THE
CONDUCT WAS ORDINARY OR PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE. .......................................................................................... 12
A.

Safeway, Inc. Failed to Establish as a Matter of
Law an Essential Element of its Statute of
Limitations Defense. .................................................. 14

B.

So v. Shin Recognized that the Purpose
Underlying a Health Care Provider’s Conduct
May Be Relevant to Determining Whether the
Claim Involves Ordinary vs. Professional
Negligence. ................................................................ 15

C.

The Court of Appeal Relied on Factually
Inapposite Cases Involving Unintentional or

Kathleen Hardin’s & Dane Hardin’s
Petition for Review

i

Accidental Conduct in the Course of
Professional Treatment. ............................................. 18
D.

The Court of Appeal’s Reliance on Flowers
Was Misplaced........................................................... 19

E.

Safeway, Inc. Had the Burden of Proof to
Establish the Affirmative Defense of Statute of
Limitations. ................................................................ 20

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 22
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ......................................................... 23

Kathleen Hardin’s & Dane Hardin’s
Petition for Review

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826........................................................................ 21, 22
Atienza v. Taub
(1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 388 ............................................................... 15, 17
Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital
(1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 1034 ................................................................. 20
Bellamy v. Appellate Dep’t
(1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 797 ........................................................ 13, 14, 19
Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1992) 3 Cal. 4th 181................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 14
Distefano v. Forester
(2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249 .................................................................... 21
Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1106 .......... 17
Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 992................................................................................ 20
Hardin v. PDX, Inc.
(2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 159 ........................................................... passim
Murillo v. Good Samaritan Hospital
(1979) 99 Cal. App. 3d 50 ....................................................................... 13
So v. Shin
(2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 652 ........................................................... passim
Taylor v. United States
(9th Cir. 1987) 821 F.2d 1428 ........................................................... 14, 19
Waters v. Bourhis
(1985) 40 Cal. 3d 424 .............................................................................. 20
Statutes
Civil Code
§ 3333.2 ..................................................................................................... 3
Kathleen Hardin’s & Dane Hardin’s
Petition for Review

iii

Nos. A141505, A141513 and A141514

Code of Civil Procedure
§ 340.5 ........................................................................................... 2, 15, 22
Code of Civil Procedure
§ 437c ...................................................................................................... 22
Regulations
21 Code of Federal Regulation
Section 201.57 ......................................................................................... 10

Kathleen Hardin’s & Dane Hardin’s
Petition for Review

iv

Nos. A141505, A141513 and A141514

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SAFEWAY, INC.,
Petitioner and Defendant,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY,
Respondent,
KATHLEEN HARDIN and DANE HARDIN,
Real Parties in Interest and Plaintiffs
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST’S
PETITION FOR REVIEW

ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the court may consider the purpose of a health care
provider’s alleged act or omission in distinguishing ordinary negligence
from an injury that is “directly related to the professional services provided
by a health care provider acting in its capacity as such.” (Central Pathology
Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 181, 191,
192.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a corporate policy adopted by a nationwide
grocery and pharmacy chain for the purpose of reducing costs by limiting to
one page the prescription drug warnings given to all consumers about all
medications. The Court of Appeal held that the action against Safeway, Inc.
asserted only professional negligence and was therefore barred by the
statute of limitations set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5,
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enacted as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975
(“MICRA”).
Plaintiff and Real Party in Interest Kathleen Hardin suffered serious
and permanent injuries from burn-like rashes after she took the prescription
drug Lamotrigine. Mrs. Hardin received an abbreviated one-page
monograph from Safeway, Inc. that listed apparently benign side effects but
failed to warn of serious, fatal or life-threatening rashes. In the trial court,
rather than defend this conduct, Safeway, Inc. moved for summary
judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court denied
Safeway, Inc.’s motion based on this Court’s decision in Central
Pathology, supra.
The Court of Appeal in an unpublished decision issued June 19,
2014 reversed, holding that “Safeway’s corporate decision-making” was
professional negligence subject to MICRA protections. In the same
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal held that the professional
negligence claims against Safeway, Inc. and Mrs. Hardin’s physician and
medical group were not timely under the delayed discovery provision of
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Plaintiffs do not seek review of the
rulings as to delayed discovery. No petition for rehearing was filed.
On June 19, 2014, the Court of Appeal also issued a published
decision in the same case, Hardin v. PDX, Inc. (2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th
159 (hereinafter, “PDX”), which affirmed the trial court’s denial of an antiSLAPP special motion to strike. This petition refers to the PDX decision
because the factual background of that appeal and this petition overlap.
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WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED
This case presents a new twist on a question that courts have
grappled with since MICRA was enacted: Where does the boundary lie
between ordinary and professional negligence for purposes of applying the
provisions of MICRA? The same question is before the Court in Flores v.
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Case No. S209836, where the issue
is whether an injury caused by negligent maintenance of a hospital bed is
ordinary or professional negligence for purposes of MICRA. More
particularly, the present case poses the question: in what circumstances
would the purpose of the negligent act or omission be relevant to
determining that boundary?
This Court in Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 181 explained that if a claim is
for an injury that is directly related to the professional
services provided by a health care provider acting in its
capacity as such, then the action is one “arising out of
the professional negligence of a health care
provider[.]”
(Id. at pp. 191-192.) Similarly, the Court in Central Pathology
quoted the statutory definition used in several MICRA provisions:
"Professional negligence" means a negligent act or
omission to act by a health care provider in the
rendering of professional services, . . . provided that
such services are within the scope of services for
which the provider is licensed . . . .
(Id. at 187 [quoting Civil Code § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2)].)
Based on this judicial and statutory language, some appellate courts
(as well as the trial court in this case) have held that the purpose of a
defendant’s conduct was relevant to determining whether the cause of
Kathleen Hardin’s and Dane Hardin’s
Petition for Review

3

action was subject to MICRA’s provisions. For example, in So v. Shin
(2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 652, 667, the court held that the doctor’s
misconduct was not professional negligence as defined by MICRA because
the doctor “acted for her own benefit, to forestall an embarrassing report
that might damage her professional reputation—not for the benefit of her
patient.” Similarly, the trial court in this case concluded that there was a
triable issue of fact as to whether the decision to limit the length of drug
warnings “was a business decision completely unrelated to providing
professional services as a health care provider.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 3, 674;
Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court, Case No. A141505, [hereinafter “Slip
op.”] at p. 7.)
The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that the purpose of the
conduct was irrelevant and that the “failure to warn Hardin of the dangers
associated with Lamotrigine cannot be fairly characterized as anything
other than professional negligence.” (Slip op. at p.15.) The Court of Appeal
rejected the trial court’s “bifurcation of the claims against Safeway into
claims of professional negligence rooted in malpractice and ordinary
negligence, rooted in Safeway’s corporate decision-making.” (Slip op. at
p. 14.) The appellate court relied on cases in which the asserted negligence
occurred in a hospital or doctor’s office during the course of treatment of
plaintiff. Such cases are fundamentally different from the facts of this case.
Here, the alleged negligence did not occur at a health care facility. It
occurred at Safeway, Inc.’s corporate headquarters long before Mrs. Hardin
was injured and far from her local pharmacy.
The evidence in the trial court showed that the pharmacist who filled
Mrs. Hardin’s prescription had no role in deciding the content of the

Kathleen Hardin’s and Dane Hardin’s
Petition for Review

4

monograph. It was undisputed that the pharmacist’s role was limited to
pushing a button that caused the monograph to print. The content of the
monograph – and of importance here, what it omitted – was dictated by a
corporate policy to use less paper and shorten monographs. This decision
was made by executives who had no role in dispensing Mrs. Hardin’s
prescription and were unaware of the contents of the Lamotrigine
monograph until this lawsuit was filed.
As a result of the appellate decisions in this case, the software
company, PDX, Inc., may be held liable for its alleged negligence in
modifying its software (at the request of Safeway, Inc.) to produce only
abbreviated drug monographs. Safeway, Inc., however, may not be held
liable for its own similar conduct, namely using PDX’s software that it
knew and intended would produce monographs that omitted drug warnings
for all of its pharmacy customers nationwide.
This Court should grant review to provide guidance as to whether
the purpose of the conduct – whether to deter a patient from complaining
about care (as in So, supra) or to improve profits (as in this case) – may be
relevant and important to the determination of whether negligent conduct
was “directly related to the professional services provided by the health
care provider acting in its capacity as such.”
BACKGROUND
A.
The Drug Information that Safeway, Inc. Provided to
Mrs. Hardin Did Not Warn Her of the Serious Risks
Associated with Lamotrigine.
Plaintiff Kathleen Hardin worked full-time as the librarian in charge
of the slide collection at the University of California, Santa Cruz until she
was stricken by the disabling and disfiguring injuries that are the subject of
this litigation. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 225.) On March 31, 2010, Mrs.
Kathleen Hardin’s and Dane Hardin’s
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Hardin’s primary care physician prescribed a new medication, Lamotrigine,
for depression. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 228-229, 287.) Her doctor did not tell
Mrs. Hardin about the potential risks or side effects associated with the
drug. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 231-232, 251, 439-441.)
After her check-up, Mrs. Hardin went to a Safeway Pharmacy in
Santa Cruz to fill the Lamotrigine prescription. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 235,
306; Safeway Pet. ¶ 6.) With her prescription she received a one-page
computer print-out (referred to as a monograph) that had the Safeway, Inc.
name and logo and that also included her name and other personal
information. She received no other written material about the prescription,
and the Safeway pharmacist did not orally provide any information or
warnings about Lamotrigine. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 235, 237, 263, 270,
306.)
Before taking Lamotrigine, Mrs. Hardin read the monograph and
believed it contained the information she needed to know about the drug.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 237-239, 265-266.) The monograph that Safeway
printed for Mrs. Hardin mentioned some side effects, such as allergic
reactions, that sounded “benign” to Mrs. Hardin. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2,
306; Safeway Pet. ¶ 9.) The monograph she received did not mention
Stevens-Johnson Syndrome (SJS), Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TENs),
serious rashes, fatal rashes, or rashes that could become life threatening
even if the medication were stopped. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 306, Safeway
Pet. ¶ 10.) Mrs. Hardin began taking Lamotrigine on April 2, 2010.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 242, 288.)
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B.

Three Weeks After Starting the Drug, Mrs. Hardin Was
Hospitalized with a Severe Case of Stevens-Johnson
Syndrome Caused by Lamotrigine.

On April 25, 2010, Mrs. Hardin began to experience a general
feeling of malaise. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 311.) The next day, Mrs. Hardin
remembered calling in to tell work she was not feeling well. The next thing
she remembered was waking up in the hospital in June 2010. (Safeway
Exs., vol. 2, 275, 285-286.) She had been diagnosed with SJS and TENs
and had spent more than a month in a coma while these conditions caused
her internal organs to fail. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 275.) When Mrs. Hardin
came out of the coma, she underwent rehabilitation, including speech
therapy, physical therapy, occupational therapy and wound treatment.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 255.) She remained hospitalized until July 16, 2010.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 256.) Due to severe scar damage to her eyes,
including perforation and melting of her cornea, she could only sense
lightness and darkness. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 254, 258.)
C.
Safeway, Inc. Corporate Headquarters Decided to Modify
Its Software so that the Safeway Pharmacies Would Only
Print Abbreviated Monographs.
Drug monographs “are produced as part of a self-regulating action
plan required under public law as approved by the Secretary of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services.” (PDX, supra, 227 Cal.
App. 4th at p.162.) After this statute 1 was enacted, a committee of
pharmacists, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, industry associations
and consumer advocates drafted and issued the “Action Plan for the
Provision of Useful Prescription Medicine Information” (“Action Plan” or
“Keystone Criteria”). (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 447-478.) “The goals [of the
1

Pub. L. No. 104-180 (Aug. 6, 1996) 110 Stat. 1593.
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Keystone Criteria] were to improve the quality of information, and thereby
reduce injury.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 391.)
The monograph for each drug was divided into standardized
sections. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 389-390.) In 1997, three additional sections
were added to the five standard sections previously included in each drug
monograph. The three new sections had the headings: “Before Using This
Medicine,” “Overdose,” and “Additional Information.” (Safeway Exs., vol.
2, 390.) “The ‘Before Using This Medication’ section contains warnings
about taking the drug that may include warnings about drug interactions or
complications due to coexisting medical conditions.” (PDX, supra, 227 Cal.
App. 4th at p.163.)
Safeway, Inc. used software created by PDX, Inc. to assemble and
automatically print monographs and labels for pharmacy customers
throughout North America. (Id. at pp.162-163.) When any Safeway
Pharmacy filled a prescription, the pharmacist would hit a button and the
PDX software automatically printed the monograph attached to a label with
the customer’s personal information. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 323-325.) The
monograph was given to the customer along with his or her prescription.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 323.)
From 1997 until 2005, PDX software allowed Safeway, Inc. the
option of printing an abbreviated version of the drug monograph that
omitted the three sections that had been added in 1997, including the
“Before Using This Medicine” section. (Ibid.) In June 2004, PDX urged its
customers (including Safeway, Inc.) to “PRINT ALL MONOGRAPH
SECTIONS” in order to comply with the Keystone Criteria. (Safeway Exs.,
vol. 2, 403). On December 17, 2004, PDX sent its customers (including
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Safeway, Inc.) a memorandum stating that in order to comply with the
Action Plan, PDX was going to eliminate the option of printing abbreviated
monographs. With the new version of the software, the complete eightsection monograph “will always print.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 391, 405.)
PDX informed Safeway and other customers: “Using the abbreviated
option does not comply with the content requirements of the Keystone
Criteria.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 405.) At the same time, PDX warned “this
will require additional space for the monographs being printed and may
result in a higher incidence of two page monographs.” (Ibid.) In 2005, the
PDX software update took effect and Safeway, Inc. was temporarily
compelled to print complete monographs for all drugs and all customers.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 391.)
In 2006, after PDX made printing all eight sections mandatory, a
corporate representative of Safeway contacted PDX to request that the
company revise the software so that Safeway could again print the five
section monographs as before. (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. App. 4th at p. 163.)
PDX and Safeway, Inc. entered into a written contract on November 29,
2006, providing that PDX would modify the software for Safeway, Inc. to
print the abbreviated five-section monographs for all medications and all
customers. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 392, 407-410.) As stated by Safeway,
Inc.’s Manager of Business Applications, Spencer Dowell (who signed the
contract with PDX): the software company “provided a solution” to the
problem of longer monographs. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 326.)
The contract between PDX and Safeway, Inc. acknowledged that
PDX had updated its software in 2005 to print only eight-section
monographs “to assist in complying with [the] requirements” of the Action
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Plan. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 407.) In addition, PDX and Safeway, Inc.
agreed that the purpose of the Action Plan was to provide information to
consumers to enable them “to use the medication properly and
appropriately, receive the maximum benefit and avoid harm.” (Ibid.) The
contract also included a provision by which Safeway, Inc. agreed to
indemnify PDX for any claims that might arise from the shortening of any
monograph. (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. App. 4th at p.163.)
Lamotrigine had a known risk of SJS, TENs, and fatal rashes, but the
“abbreviated warning utilized by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted
what is referred to as the ‘Black Box’ warning . . . that stated: ‘SERIOUS
AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY
WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE.’” (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. App. 4th
at p.163.) A black box warning (also called a “boxed warning”) was the
strongest warning that the FDA could require. It meant that medical studies
showed a significant risk of serious or life-threatening adverse effects from
the drug. (21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (c)(1).)
D.

The Decision to Use Abbreviated Monographs Was Made
by the Safeway, Inc. Corporate Executive Responsible for
the Profitability of the Pharmacies Nationwide.

Safeway, Inc. conceded that the decision to shorten the monographs
was made in 2006 by David Fong at Safeway, Inc.’s corporate office.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 1, 36; Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 332.) From 2005 to 2010,
Mr. Fong held the titles of “Senior Vice President and GM, Pharmacy,
Health and Wellness” and “Senior Vice President of Pharmacy.” (Safeway
Exs., vol. 2, 371.) He oversaw 1,200 pharmacies in the U.S. and Canada.
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 348.)
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Mr. Fong was responsible for the profitability of the business unit
called “Pharmacy.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 345.) A written job description
stated that the Safeway, Inc. senior VP/GM of pharmacy was “responsible
for increasing shareholder value,” and the incumbent should “[c]ontinually
develop ways to measure, define, interpret, and report on department
metrics including wage controls, sales margin, department net gain and
work to optimize program efficiencies (Six Sigma Lean certification) and
increased performance.” (Safeway Exs. vol. 2, at 384.) He reviewed
financial statements to identify contributors to the overall profitability of
the pharmacy business unit, and determine where Safeway, Inc. could
“optimize” sales and/or reduce costs. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 345-347, 356.)
He tracked expenditures on accounting reports. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 366.)
In order to increase profits, Mr. Fong considered expenditures such as
salaries of pharmacy personnel, lights in the building, technology, and
importantly, supplies, which included vials, prescription labels, and printer
paper. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 358-359.)
Mr. Fong never worked filling prescriptions behind the counter at a
Safeway Pharmacy. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 360, 349.) Mr. Fong did not
dispense medications, medication labels, or product information to
customers. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 344, 349.) Nor did Mr. Fong perform any
other work of a pharmacist, and his position did not require him to be a
licensed pharmacist (although he was one). (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 331, 333,
378.)
Mr. Fong also did not oversee how the Safeway pharmacies
provided information to customers or attempt to ensure that information
provided to customers was complete and accurate. He relied on
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manufacturers to do so. He never read any of the monographs printed for
Safeway customers using PDX software. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 363-365.)
He also did not recall ever having gone to a pharmacy to have someone
show him how the PDX software worked. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 353-354.)
After leaving his position at Safeway, Inc., Mr. Fong eventually went to
work for PDX. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 371.)
Spencer Dowell, Safeway, Inc.’s Manager of Business Applications,
implemented the decision by Mr. Fong to shorten all drug monographs.
Before this lawsuit was filed, Mr. Dowell had never reviewed a
Lamotrigine monograph. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 323.)
In the trial court, Safeway, Inc. provided no evidence in its moving
papers that the decision by Mr. Fong to modify the PDX software and
shorten all monographs for all drugs was based on any consideration related
to the rendering of healthcare services to pharmacy customers. Safeway,
Inc., merely contended that the 2006 policy decision “to use the form of
monograph received by Plaintiff Kathleen Hardin was made by two
licensed Safeway pharmacists [Mr. Fong and Mr. Dowell] within
Safeway’s Pharmacy Division” (Safeway Exs., vol. 1, 206.)
LEGAL DISCUSSION
THE PURPOSE OF A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER’S ACT OR
OMISSION MAY BE HIGHLY RELEVANT TO WHETHER THE
CONDUCT WAS ORDINARY OR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE.
The trial court in this case held that there were disputed facts as to
whether the MICRA statute of limitations applied to Safeway, Inc.’s
omission of FDA-approved warnings from its Lamotrigine monograph. As
the trial court ruled, a pharmacy “might be considered a health care
provider pursuant to MICRA in some circumstances [but] the court does
not find that [Safeway, Inc.] is a health care provider for purposes of
Kathleen Hardin’s and Dane Hardin’s
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MICRA under all circumstances.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 3, 673.) In other
words, “not every act of negligence by a professional is an act of
professional negligence, even where the victim is a client[.]” (Bellamy v.
Appellate Dep’t (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 797, 803 [quoting Murillo v. Good
Samaritan Hospital (1979) 99 Cal. App. 3d 50, 56].)
The Court of Appeal did not conclude that a negligent act that
injured a patient must necessarily be professional negligence. But it held
that the trial court had erred in considering the reason for the conduct,
whether based on business or medical concerns. The appellate court
analogized Mrs. Hardin’s claim to cases involving negligent or
unintentional conduct during treatment, such as the hypothetical “bump of a
janitor’s broom” that may have disconnected a hospital ventilator 2 or the
failure to secure a patient to a bed while taking an x-ray. 3 In these cases, it
was fairly obvious that the defendants were rendering some service to
plaintiff at the time of the injury. But were they professional services? The
courts in those cases decided that they were.
The claim against Safeway, Inc. is different. In this case, the
negligent conduct – adopting a policy (implemented with the participation
of PDX, Inc.) to reduce paper use by printing only five-out-of-eight
monograph sections – occurred years before plaintiff’s injury, in a different
location, and involved actors who had no knowledge of Mrs. Hardin or
Lamotrigine before this lawsuit. When he made the decision in 2006, Mr.
Fong was not providing services to any pharmacy customer. To determine

2

Taylor v. United States (9th Cir. 1987) 821 F.2d 1428, 1432.

3

Bellamy, supra, 50 Cal. App 4th at 808.
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whether this decision related to the “rendering of professional services,” it
is logical and necessary to consider the purpose of the underlying conduct.
As the trial court ruled, Safeway’s motion failed because “triable
issues of fact exist as to whether these actions were ‘directly related to the
professional services provided by a health care provider acting in its
capacity as such.’” (Safeway Exs., vol. 3, 674 [quoting Central Pathology
Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 181, 191].)
Other cases have considered purpose or motive to decide this
question. For example, when an anesthesiologist, motivated by her selfinterest, threatened a patient to deter her from reporting negligent medical
care, the doctor was not “rendering professional services” that were subject
to MICRA. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 652.) Similarly, when a
doctor motivated by his own gratification had sexual relations with a
patient during treatment, that was not deemed the rendering of professional
services and did not give rise to a claim for professional negligence.
(Atienza v. Taub (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 388, 392-394.)
In this case there are triable issues of fact as to whether Safeway,
Inc. modified its software for the purpose of rendering professional services
or to improve its bottom line by using less printer paper.
A.
Safeway, Inc. Failed to Establish as a Matter of Law an
Essential Element of its Statute of Limitations Defense.
The MICRA statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.5 applies if the claim is for the “rendering of professional
services . . . for which the provider is licensed.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5.)
Safeway, Inc. did not carry its burden of establishing this element.
Safeway, Inc. did not modify its software to omit important drug warnings
in the “rendering of professional services . . . for which [it] is licensed.” To
Kathleen Hardin’s and Dane Hardin’s
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the contrary, the record suggests that Safeway, Inc.’s purpose in omitting
the warnings and printing shorter monographs was to improve profits. 4
B.
So v. Shin Recognized that the Purpose Underlying a
Health Care Provider’s Conduct Was Relevant to
Determining Whether the Claim Involved Ordinary vs.
Professional Negligence.
Case law has recognized that misconduct by a health care provider is
not necessarily professional negligence, even when the misconduct occurs
over the same period of time that medical services are provided. Rather,
professional negligence may only arise from conduct that is “for the
purpose of delivering medical care to a patient.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.
App. 4th 652, 666-67.) “[T]ortious actions undertaken for a different
purpose . . . are not” professional negligence. (Id.) In this case, too,
considering the reason for the software modification would be relevant to
determining whether the conduct was for the purpose of rendering
professional services or was an ordinary and usual part of a pharmacist’s
services.
In So, the defendant administered anesthesia to plaintiff during a
dilation and curettage procedure. As a result of insufficient anesthesia,
plaintiff woke up with pain and discomfort during the procedure. (Id. at
p.657.) After the procedure, while still in the recovery room, plaintiff asked
Dr. Shin why she had woken up during the procedure. Dr. Shin became
upset, shoved a container holding plaintiff’s blood and tissue at her, and
told her not to tell anyone that she had woken up. (Id. at p.657-658.)
4

Section 340.5 also requires that the defendant be a “health care
provider” licensed or certified under California law. Safeway, Inc. also
failed to produce uncontested evidence that its corporate headquarters was
– or under the law, could be – licensed by the State Board of Pharmacy.
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In considering whether plaintiff’s claim against the anesthesiologist
was “professional negligence” for purposes of the statute of limitations, the
court in So stated that physician misconduct is “not necessarily professional
negligence—even where, as here, the misconduct occurs ‘over the same
period of time’ that medical services are provided.” (Id. at p.666.)
Rather, professional negligence is only that negligent conduct
engaged in for the purpose of (or the purported purpose of)
delivering health care to a patient—or, in the words of our
Supreme Court in Central Pathology, conduct “directly related to
the professional services provided by a health care provider acting
in its capacity as such” and that “is an ordinary and usual part of
medical professional services.” (Id. at pp.666-667.)
For example, the Court noted, “tortious actions undertaken . . . for
the physician’s sexual gratification—are not” acts for the purpose of
delivering health care. (Id. at pp.667-668 [citing Atienza v. Taub (1987) 194
Cal.App.3d 388].) Similarly, the So Court concluded that Dr. Shin’s
conduct was not for the purpose of rendering health care:
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Shin engaged in the
alleged tortious conduct for the purpose of persuading plaintiff not
to report to the hospital or medical group that plaintiff had
awakened during surgery. In other words, plaintiff alleges that Dr.
Shin acted for her own benefit, to forestall an embarrassing report
that might damage her professional reputation — not for the
benefit of her patient. (Id. at p.667.)
The only evidence Safeway submitted with its moving papers in
support of its contention that the software modification was for the purpose
of rendering professional services was the fact that Mr. Fong was a licensed
pharmacist. (Safeway Exs., vol. 1, 206.) That is irrelevant. Mr. Fong’s
position as the executive overseeing all Safeway pharmacies did not require
a pharmacist license. More importantly, as So held, the purpose of the
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conduct was determinative, not the defendant’s licensure. (So, supra, 212
Cal. App. 4th at pp.666-667.)
Similarly, Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal. App.
3d 1106 held that the licensure of the actor does not determine whether the
conduct was professional negligence. Natividad involved both negligence
claims against individual physicians and a claim under Government Code
section 845.6 based on the failure by state employees – some of whom were
physicians – to summon medical care. Natividad held that MICRA did not
apply to the failure-to-summon claim because “the true nature of the action
against the State” was not “one for professional negligence” simply because
“fortuitously, the employees who failed to summon assistance were
doctors.” (Id. at pp. 1116-1117.) Nor was the state operating as a “health
care provider” as defined in MICRA. (Ibid.)
It is telling that in its motion for summary judgment, Safeway
presented no evidence that it considered any reason founded in medicine or
patient care for this decision. It is hard to imagine that a pharmacist
involved in rendering professional services to a patient would omit FDAapproved warnings of “serious and sometimes fatal rashes” from a
monograph – while nonetheless providing information about less serious
side effects, such as allergic reactions. As the trial court ruled: “Logically,
the decision [to modify the software] does not appear to have been directly
related” to the rendering of professional services. (Safeway Exs., vol. 3,
674.)
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C.

The Court of Appeal Relied on Factually Inapposite Cases
Involving Unintentional or Accidental Conduct in the
Course of Professional Treatment.

The Court of Appeal inaptly analogized Safeway’s decision to
modify software across its North American pharmacy business to cases
involving accidental occurrences during the immediate and direct provision
of health care. It did not matter in these cases whether the negligent conduct
involved skilled or unskilled services or were rendered by licensed or
unlicensed personnel – it was all deemed professional negligence. In those
cases, the conduct was closely related – in time, place and purpose – to the
provision of services to a specific plaintiff.
The cases on which the Court of Appeal relied explain that in the
course of medical treatment, doctors and other professionals “perform a
variety of tasks” and “[s]ome of those tasks may require a high degree of
skill and judgment, but others do not.” (Bellamy, supra, 50 Cal. App. 4th at
808.) “Each, however, is an integral part of the professional service being
rendered.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in another case the court cited, a government
hospital “had a professional duty to prevent Taylor’s husband from
becoming separated from his ventilator, regardless of whether separation
was caused by the ill-considered decision of a physician or the accidental
bump of a janitor’s broom.” (Taylor v. United States (9th Cir. 1987) 821
F.2d 1428, 1432.)
These cases, however, do not resolve the issue of whether Safeway,
Inc.’s corporate decision to reduce the amount of paper it used was ordinary
or professional negligence. In this case, the evidence showed that the Santa
Cruz Safeway Pharmacy (where Mrs. Hardin filled her prescription) and the
pharmacists who worked there had no role in deciding the content of the
monographs. Safeway, Inc. did not dispute that the local pharmacist’s role
Kathleen Hardin’s and Dane Hardin’s
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in producing the monograph was limited to pushing a button that caused the
document to print. The content of the monograph – and of importance here,
what it omitted – was dictated by a corporate policy to shorten all
monographs and thereby use less paper.
It is clear that the failure to warn Mrs. Hardin was no accident. It
was the result of a deliberate decision that affected customers at all 1,200
Safeway, Inc. pharmacies in North America. The appellate court decision
identified nothing in the record linking this decision to the rendering of
professional services to Mrs. Hardin. In order to conclude that this conduct
was “inextricably interwoven” with delivering competent medical care to a
patient, 5 the court in a case such as this one should consider the reason for
the conduct.
D.

The Court of Appeal’s Reliance on Flowers Was
Misplaced.

The Court of Appeal stated that there can be only one standard of
care, and therefore Safeway cannot be liable both for ordinary negligence
(based on its corporate decision to modify the software) and for
professional negligence (based on the failure of its pharmacists to counsel
and provide information to Mrs. Hardin). That is not true. As this Court has
recognized, “many malpractice actions will be pursued both on MICRA
and non-MICRA theories.” (Waters v. Bourhis (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 424, 437
fn. 13.) Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8
Cal.4th 992 – cited by the Court of Appeal at page 15 of the slip opinion –
does not hold otherwise. In Flowers, the plaintiff alleged both ordinary and
5

See Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 1034,

1051.
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professional negligence based on a single omission: the failure to raise a
safety rail that allowed plaintiff to fall off a gurney. The Court held that this
conduct must be judged by a single legal standard. That holding has no
bearing on the multiple claims in this lawsuit, which are based on distinct
conduct that occurred years apart, was carried out by different Safeway
employees, in different locations, and for different reasons.
E.
Safeway, Inc. Had the Burden of Proof to Establish the
Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations.
The Court of Appeal in finding that the MICRA statute of limitations
barred the action erroneously applied the rule that for purposes of summary
judgment, “the pleadings set the boundaries of the dispute.” (Slip op. at p.
14.) This rule applies when the moving party seeks summary judgment on
the ground that “plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause
of action.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853–
854.) As the opposing party, the plaintiff must direct any opposition
evidence toward the issues raised by the pleadings. (Distefano v. Forester
(2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264-1265.) “It is not appropriate, at that
time, to raise new legal theories or claims not yet pleaded, if there has been
no request for leave to amend accordingly, prior to the summary judgment
proceedings.” (Ibid.)
Safeway, Inc. did not attempt to show that the Mrs. Hardin was not
injured by the negligent failure to warn her of the known risks of
Lamotrigine. Instead, the motion was based on the affirmative defense of
statutes of limitations. When the defendant moves for summary judgment
on this basis, the defendant bears both the initial burden of production and
the burden of persuasion that the limitations period has expired. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The “initial burden of production [requires the
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defendant] to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a
shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of
his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
The ultimate burden here was on Safeway, Inc. to show based on
undisputed evidence that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 barred the
negligence cause of action. First, however, Safeway, Inc. had to make a
prima facie showing that the cause of action was based on the “rendering of
professional services . . . for which the provider is licensed.” (Code Civ.
Proc. § 340.5.)
The only undisputed evidence in the record relevant to Safeway,
Inc.’s affirmative defense was that (1) Mr. Fong, who happened to be a
licensed pharmacist, was responsible for the corporate policy of using
abbreviated monographs; and (2) the local pharmacy and pharmacist who
dispensed Lamotrigine to Mrs. Hardin were also licensed. Based on the
complete record, the trial court found that Safeway, Inc. had failed to meet
its burden of showing through undisputed evidence that the MICRA statute
of limitations applied.
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CONCLUSION
This case raises issues that are important to both health care
providers and patients. The Court should clarify when and how evidence of
the purpose of the conduct may be relevant to distinguishing professional
from ordinary negligence. This is a recurrent challenge for courts, as shown
by Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, another case now
pending in this Court. For this reason, the Court should grant review of this
case.
Dated: July 29, 2014
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MEDICAL GROUP, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA,
Respondent;
KATHLEEN HARDIN and DANE
HARDIN,

A141513
(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG11600291)
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A141514
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(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG11600291)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ALAMEDA COUNTY,
Respondent;

1

KATHLEEN HARDIN and DANE
HARDIN,
Real Parties in Interest.
Due to side effects of a drug prescribed by her physician, real party Kathleen
Hardin sustained severe and debilitating injuries. She alleged she was not warned
of these potential, serious side effects of the medication by her doctor, petitioner
Sharon S. Jamieson, M.D., the medical practice that employs Jamieson—petitioner
Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group, Inc. [Medical Group], or by the dispensing
pharmacy, petitioner Safeway, Inc. Hardin, together with her husband, real party
Dane Hardin (Dane),1 sued various defendants, including petitioners, for
negligence and loss of consortium. Petitioners brought separate motions for
summary judgment, based on their contention that the complaint was untimely.
The superior court denied Jamieson’s and the Medical Group’s summary judgment
motions, finding there were triable issues of fact regarding the delayed discovery
by Hardin of the cause of her injuries. The court also denied Safeway’s motion for
summary judgment, in part, due to Hardin’s delayed discovery of the cause of her
injuries and, in part, because it was not established that in all relevant respects,
Safeway was a health care provider pursuant to the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act [MICRA] entitled to protection of the statute of limitations for
professional negligence.
Petitioners each filed timely petitions for writ of mandate in this court. For
purposes of this decision only, we consolidate these petitions because they are
based on a common set of facts. There are no material disputed facts concerning
the applicability of the statute of limitations. We conclude that Hardin and her
1

For ease of reference and to avoid confusion, we will refer to Mr. Hardin by his
first name. We intend no disrespect.
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husband knew her injuries were caused by her adverse reaction to medication in
June 2010. Her complaint was not filed within one year of her discovery and is
barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. We also conclude that Safeway
was acting as a health care provider in the events alleged in Hardin’s complaint
and entitled to the limitations period in section 340.5. We direct the superior court
to vacate its orders denying summary judgment and to issue new and different
orders granting the summary judgment motions in favor of each petitioner.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hardin was generally under the care of Jamieson, her primary care
physician, from sometime in 2002 through June 29, 2011. On March 31, 2010
Jamieson prescribed a new medication, Lamictal, for Hardin without discussing
any of the potential risks or side effects associated with the drug. Hardin filled the
prescription with Lamotrigine, the generic form of Lamictal, at a Safeway
pharmacy in Santa Cruz. She received a one-page computer print-out at the
pharmacy which discussed some possible side effects of the drug such as allergic
reactions. The print-out did not mention Stevens-Johnson Syndrome (SJS), Toxic
Epidermal Necrolysis (TENs) or other serious or life-threatening risks. The
pharmacist gave Hardin no verbal or supplemental warnings other than the
computer print-out. Hardin began taking 25 milligrams per day on April 2, 2010,
and gradually increased the dosage. On April 21, 2010, Jamieson wrote her a new
prescription for 100-milligram tablets. When Hardin filled this second prescription
she received from Safeway an identical print-out concerning Lamotrigine that she
had previously received. Again she received no verbal or supplemental warnings.
On April 25 Hardin began to experience a sense of malaise. The next day
she called her work to inform them that she was not well. She has no further
memories of what happened until she awoke in the hospital in June 2010. The day
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after Hardin remembers calling work, her husband, Dane, took her to urgent care in
Santa Cruz because her condition seemed to be deteriorating. She had small
blotches on her face and chest, and her eyes were bloodshot. The next day she was
hospitalized at Dominican Hospital, where she went into a coma. She was
diagnosed with SJS, a condition that causes internal and external burn-like rashes.
On April 28, 2010 she was transferred to the burn unit of the Santa Clara Valley
Medical Center, where she was in a coma from April 28 until sometime in June
2010, while SJS and TENs2 caused organ failure. On July 16, 2010, when
discharged from the hospital in Santa Clara, Hardin still had open wounds and was
virtually blind, able only to sense light and dark.
Hardin testified that once she awoke from the coma she was told in June
2010 that she had SJS and TENs and that those conditions were caused by
Lamotrigine. She did not know, however, whether the conditions were common
complications from Lamotrigine or had been reported in the literature. Dane, on
the other hand, had researched the side effects of Lamotrigine and learned on April
27, 2010, that SJS was a potential side effect, after his wife was seen in the Urgent
Care Clinic and was instructed to stop taking the medication immediately. Also, in
April 2010 Dr. Berger, a physician at the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center,
informed Dane that his wife’s SJS was due to Lamotrigine. In June 2010 Dane
told his wife that she had developed SJS due to the Lamotrigine.
On July 19, 2011 the Hardins consulted an attorney to find out if
pharmaceutical companies had a fund to pay for medical expenses related to
adverse drug reactions. The attorney informed them that he was unaware of any
such fund, but suggested they consult other counsel to investigate whether they had
a viable claim of medical malpractice. It was only after this meeting that Hardin
2

TENs is a life-threatening skin condition in which the top layer of skin, the
epidermis, detaches from the lower layers, dermis, all over the body.
4

learned that SJS, TENs and serious and fatal rashes were known risks associated
with Lamotrigine. Indeed, she learned sometime after July 2011 that the Food and
Drug Administration required “boxed warnings” for Lamotrigine concerning the
possibility that SJS and “life threatening rashes” might be caused by the drug. A
“boxed warning” is the strongest warning the FDA can require and signifies that studies
show a significant risk of serious or life-threatening adverse effects from taking the drug.
(21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1).) Boxed warnings were omitted from the print-outs Hardin

had been provided by Safeway.
The printouts Safeway provided were products of software created by PDX,
Inc., which Safeway used to provide patients with monographs containing useful,
accurate, and comprehensive information about prescription drugs, including the
appropriate warnings. Prior to 2005, PDX’s software enabled its licensees to print
out either the long (eight-section) or short (five section) version of the monograph
for any given drug. The short version excluded sections under the headings
“Before Using This Medication,” “Overdose,” and “Additional Information.” The
“Before Using This Medication” section contained warnings about taking the drug
that may include warnings about drug interactions or complications due to
coexisting medical conditions. In 2005, in response to regulatory guidelines, PDX
revised its software so that it would no longer print the abbreviated monographs.
For reasons not clear from the record, Safeway did not want to utilize the full
eight-section monographs and asked PDX to revise its software so that Safeway
could continue to print only the five-section versions. PDX complied with that
request after it obtained a release of liability and indemnity agreement from
Safeway. Safeway’s decision to use the abbreviated monographs was made by
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David Fong, Safeway’s senior vice president of pharmacy, who oversaw 1,200
Safeway pharmacies and was responsible for their profitability.3
When it denied the Medical Group’s and Jamieson’s summary judgment
motions the court wrote, in part:
“Plaintiffs have raised triable issues of fact as to whether they are
entitled to apply the ‘discovery rule’ for delayed accrual of the claims
as to Defendant. ‘The discovery rule provides that the accrual date of
a cause of action is delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury
and its negligent cause.’ (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1998) 44 Cal.3d
1103, 1109.)
While it is undisputed that Plaintiffs were aware that Kathleen’s
injuries were caused by Lamotrigine, it does not appear that they
suspected that Dr. Jamieson, or Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group
. . . contributed to the injuries she sustained in early 2010. Indeed,
Sharon S. Jamieson, M.D. was Kathleen’s primary care physician
from 2002 until June 2011. . . . The fact that Plaintiffs continued to
trust Kathleen’s medical care to Dr. Jamieson and PAFMG strongly
suggests a level of trust that indicates Plaintiffs had no idea that either
defendant may have contributed to her injury or that her injury was
caused by wrongdoing. Triable issues of fact exist as to whether the
confidential and fiduciary relationship of physician and patient
excused Plaintiffs from greater diligence in determining the cause of
Kathleen’s injury. . . .
Still further, triable issues of fact exist as to whether a reasonable
person would have suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing.
It cannot be determined as a matter of law when the limitations period
began to run by the evidence presented. Accordingly, summary
judgment must be denied.”
When it denied Safeway’s summary judgment motion, the trial court wrote:
“While Defendant might be considered a health care provider
pursuant to MICRA in some circumstances, the court does not find
3

Fong was a licensed pharmacist, although being licensed was not a requirement
of his position.
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that Defendant is a health care provider for purposes of MICRA
under all circumstances.
As to the claims that Defendant failed to provide a medication guide
and consultation, MICRA applies because these claims are ‘directly
related to the professional services provided by a health care provider
acting in its capacity as such.’ [Citation.] Plaintiffs concede this in
arguing that the one year statute of limitations does not bar their
claims. In opposition, Plaintiffs have raised triable issues of fact as to
whether they are entitled to apply the ‘discovery rule’ for delayed
accrual of the claims as to Defendant. ‘The discovery rule provides
that the accrual date of a cause of action is delayed until the plaintiff
is aware of her injury and its negligent cause.’ (Jolly v. Eli Lilly &
Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1109.)
As to claims arising from Defendant’s corporate decision to provide
all patients a five paragraph ‘short form’ monograph, rather than an
eight paragraph ‘long form’ monograph, thereby omitting warnings
regarding medications, the court finds that Defendant has not
established that MICRA applies.
The court finds that triable issues of fact exist as to whether these
actions were ‘directly related to the professional services provided by
a health care provider acting in its capacity as such.’ [Citation.]
Logically, the decision does not appear to have been directly related.
Further, Plaintiffs have submitted evidence that raises triable issues of
fact as to whether this was a business decision completely unrelated
to providing professional services as a health care provider.”
Petitioners challenged the denial of their respective summary judgment
motions with the petitions for writ of mandate pending before this court.4 On April
17, 2014 we requested informal opposition and notified the parties that we were
considering the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance, pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1088 and Palma v. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.
4

Not directly related to the issues raised by these petitions, defendants, PDX, Inc.
filed an appeal of the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. (See Hardin v. PDX, Inc.
(A137035).)
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(1984) 36 Cal.3d 171. Having carefully reviewed the informal briefing, for the
reasons stated below, we now issue a peremptory writ directing the trial court to
grant petitioners’ motions for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. WRIT RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE.
A trial court’s decision denying a motion for summary judgment is properly
reviewed by a timely petition for a writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c,
subd. (m)(1); American Internat. Underwriters Agency Corp. v. Superior Court
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1357, 1362.) Writ review of a superior court order is
appropriate under various criteria, including situations where, as here, the lower
court’s order is both clearly erroneous and substantially prejudices the petitioner’s
case. (See Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266,
1273–1274.) In this case, petitioners would be substantially prejudiced if
compelled to go through trial when the statute of limitations bars the suit against
them. Our review is de novo. (Monticello Ins. Co. v. Essex Ins. Co. (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385.)
II. THE “DELAYED DISCOVERY” RULE DOES NOT OPERATE TO MAKE
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST JAMIESON OR PAFMG TIMELY.
Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an action for
professional negligence against a health care provider must be brought no later
than the earlier of (1) three years from the date of injury or (2) one year after the
plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury. (Code Civ. Pro., § 340.5.) Thus, we must consider how
soon after awakening from her coma should Hardin have known she was injured
by her use of Lamotrigine.
As explained by the California Supreme Court, a “plaintiff discovers the
cause of action when he at least suspects a factual basis, as opposed to a legal
8

theory, for its elements, even if he lacks knowledge thereof—when, simply put, he
at least ‘suspects . . . that someone has done something wrong’ to him . . . ‘wrong’
being used, not in any technical sense, but rather in accordance with its ‘lay
understanding.’ . . . He has reason to discover the cause of action when he has
reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements. . . . He has reason to
suspect when he has ‘ “ ‘ “notice or information of circumstances to put a
reasonable person on inquiry” ’ ” ’ (. . . italics in original); he need not know the
‘specific ‘facts’ necessary to establish’ the cause of action; rather, he may seek to
learn such facts through the ‘process contemplated by pretrial discovery’; but,
within the applicable limitations period, he must indeed seek to learn the facts
necessary to bring the cause of action in the first place — he ‘cannot wait for’ them
‘to find’ him and ‘sit on’ his ‘rights’; he ‘must go find’ them himself if he can and
‘file suit’ if he does.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397–398
(citations and footnotes omitted).) “The test is whether the plaintiff has
information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or
has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her
investigation. (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.) Being put on
notice does not mean necessarily that the plaintiff has complete information; rather
there must simply be “a connection between the facts discovered and the further
facts to be discovered that the former may be said to furnish a reasonable and
natural clue to the latter.” (West v. Great Western Power Co. of California (1940)
36 Cal.App.2d 403, 407.)
A. Claims Brought by Hardin
In June 2010 when she awoke from her coma, Hardin was informed that she
had SJS and TENs, which had been caused by the Lamotrigine. She also knew at
that time that she had not been warned about those or similarly severe side effects
of the medication when it was prescribed or provided to her. Her husband, both
9

from his own research and from his discussion with Dr. Berger, learned in April
2010 that the drug likely caused his wife’s injuries. In other words, as of April
2010 Dane knew that his wife’s conditions had been reported as adverse reactions
to Lamotrigine, and in June 2010, Hardin knew her injuries were caused by the
drug.
On these facts, we can only conclude that by July 2010 a reasonable person
would have been put on notice to investigate the situation further. To be certain—
in April 2010—one reasonable person, Dane, did so.5 But more importantly, by
June 2010 Hardin had information that Lamotrigine caused her condition that
should have led naturally and directly to her asking about what was known
concerning these adverse reactions. The urgent care doctor, whom she saw when
she began to experience symptoms, told her to stop taking the Lamotrigine
immediately. This strongly suggests the doctor was aware of a possible link
between Lamotrigine and the types of symptoms Hardin was experiencing.
Furthermore, when a reasonable person awakens from a coma and learns that a
medication caused her condition, one would expect her to inquire whether the side
effects of the medication were common or previously known.
This case is analogous to Christ v. Lipsitz (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 894, 898
where a wife’s pregnancy did not conclusively prove that a man’s vasectomy had
been ineffective, but suggested the possibility, thereby triggering the duty to
investigate. Just as the Christs’ case was barred because of their failure promptly
to investigate the effectiveness of the husband’s vasectomy once there was a
5

In reviewing the denial of a summary judgment motion we do not make
credibility determinations such as whether it is plausible, as stated by Hardin, for her to
have suffered a debilitating effect of a medication, for her husband to know that it was a
reported adverse effect, for them to have discussed her condition when she awoke from a
coma, and for him not to have told her that she suffered known adverse reactions.
Accepting those facts to be true, however, we view them as evidence that at the very
least, Hardin made an unreasonably limited inquiry into her situation.
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reason to believe he fathered a child after his vasectomy, so too is Hardin’s case
barred by her failure to investigate the possibility that the adverse effects she
suffered from Lamotrigine were generally known in the medical community once
she was aware the medicine caused her condition.
1. The “Continuous Treatment” Rule Does Not Make Hardin’s Claims
Timely.
When a patient continues to receive care from a doctor after the date of the
alleged malpractice, the patient is generally excused from diligently determining
the cause of his or her injury. (See e.g., Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767,
777–778.) This rule is premised upon the doctor’s continuing duty to disclose the
full extent of a patient’s injuries and any likely future disability. Anything the
doctor does to conceal those facts and prevent the patient from consulting other
doctors is deemed to be a fraud perpetrated by the doctor against the patient and
excuses a lack of diligence on the part of the patient. There are two reasons,
however, why this rule does not apply here to excuse Hardin’s lack of diligence.
First, in construing a prior version of section 340.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, our Supreme Court held that the provision excusing a lack of diligence
during nondisclosure by the health care provider applied only to the limitations
period triggered by the date of injury and not to the one-year period triggered by
the discovery of the alleged malpractice or when it should have been discovered
had the plaintiff used reasonable diligence. (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 93.) The Court emphasized that applying the continuous
treatment exception to the period triggered by the actual discovery of the
malpractice or its discovery through reasonable diligence would unreasonably, but
indefinitely, suspend the limitations period even in cases where the plaintiff
actually discovered or should have discovered the basis of a potential suit. The
Court considered such a result “seemingly at odds with common sense” and
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concluded that “[t]he mere statement of [the result] argues against its acceptance.”
(Id. at 98.) Although the Sanchez court was interpreting a pre-1975 version of
section 340.5, its logic remains valid. Thus, we decline to hold that the
“continuous treatment” rule saves Hardin’s causes of action for professional
medical negligence.
2. Hardin Was Not Continuously Under Jamieson’s Care
In addition, from April 27, 2010 through July 16, 2010, Hardin’s condition
was not diagnosed and treated by Jamieson, but by doctors at the Urgent Care
Center in Santa Cruz, Dominican Hospital, and Santa Clara Valley Medical Center.
Although Hardin continued under Jamieson’s care after July 16, 2010, she had
ample opportunity to discuss her condition with other physicians, including Dr.
Berger, who had initially instructed her to stop taking the Lamotrigine and who
directly told Dane that his wife’s SJS was caused by the Lamotrigine. After
coming out of her coma in June 2010 Hardin remained hospitalized, i.e., under the
care of other doctors, until July 16, 2010, giving her ample opportunity to discuss
her situation with them. Notwithstanding the fact that Hardin resumed receiving
medical care from Jamieson after her hospitalization, she was not precluded in any
way from obtaining the relevant information directly from the doctors who treated
her in the Santa Cruz Urgent Care Center, Dominican Hospital, and/or Santa Clara
Valley Medical Center. Thus, the level of diligence she should have shown in
reasonably pursuing her claim should not be excused because she returned to
Jamieson’s care after her hospitalization.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations, Code of Civil Procedure section
340.5, bars Hardin’s claims against both Jamieson and the Medical Group.
Hardin’s complaint was not filed until October 18, 2011, more than a year from the
latest possible date in June 2010 when she knew or should have known of her
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injuries from Lamotrigine. Thus, her claims for professional negligence were not
timely.
B. Dane’s Claims Are Also Untimely.
Dane, of course, was on inquiry notice as of April 27, 2010, because he
discovered the facts concerning his wife’s injuries as of that date. His complaint,
also was not filed until October 18, 2011. He cites Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1067, for the proposition that notwithstanding the one-year
limitations period his loss of consortium claim is timely because it is derivative of
his wife’s claims. Blain, however, simply stands for the proposition that where a
plaintiff who suffered the primary injury cannot state a valid tort claim, his or her
spouse cannot claim loss of consortium. (Ibid.) Admittedly, Dane’s loss of
consortium claim is derivative of Hardin’s in the sense that it arises out of her
injuries. However, it is an independent legal claim. (See Leonard v. John Crane,
Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1279–1280 [“While joinder of a loss of
consortium claim with the injured spouse’s personal injury claim is encouraged, it
is not mandatory and a loss of consortium claim may be maintained
independently.”].) Because Dane’s loss of consortium claim is separate and
distinct from his Hardin’s, the time period for him to have brought his claim began
accruing April 27, 2010. Thus the October 18, 2011 complaint was untimely as to
Dane as well.6

6

Even if we accepted Dane’s theory—which we reject—his claims would still be
untimely because it is premised on the notion that a loss of consortium claim is timely
when the underlying tort claim is timely. Here, as discussed above, Hardin’s underlying
claim is untimely.
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III. ALL THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SAFEWAY FALL WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND ARE, THUS, BARRED BY
SECTION 340.5’S ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In denying Safeway’s summary judgment motion, the trial court divided the
claims against Safeway into those based on conduct which occurred in the course
of Safeway’s capacity as a health care provider, such as not providing an adequate
medication guide and consultation, and acts and decisions which were made in
Safeway’s corporate capacity, such as the decision to provide patients with an
abbreviated monograph. With respect to the former, the court found that the
Hardins raised triable issues of fact concerning the applicability of the delayed
discovery rule. We reject application of the delayed discovery rule to Safeway’s
conduct for the same reasons we have rejected the claims against the Medical
Group and Jamieson. The Hardins’ delay in investigating the potential claims or
filing suit was unreasonable. Thus the delayed discovery rule does not apply to toll
the limitations period.
We also must reject the superior court’s bifurcation of the claims against
Safeway into claims of professional negligence rooted in malpractice and ordinary
negligence, rooted in Safeway’s corporate decision-making.7 For purposes of
deciding a summary judgment motion, the pleadings set the boundaries of the
dispute. (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 499.)
Paragraphs 26 through 28 of the complaint allege the Hardins’ negligence claim
against Safeway. The thrust of paragraph 27 accuses Safeway of providing Hardin
with a dangerous drug without warning her about Lamotrigine and the risks
associated with taking Lamotrigine and Effexor simultaneously. These allegations
fall squarely within section 340.5’s definition of professional negligence, i.e., “a
7

If the statute of limitations for ordinary negligence were to apply, the Hardins
would have two years to bring this claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.)
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negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of
professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal
injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of
services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction
imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5,
subd. (2).)
The closest the complaint comes to mentioning any “corporate” act by
Safeway is the allegation that Safeway was negligent by “hiring, buying,
purchasing drug literature from Defendant Wolters Kluwer, Inc. to be provided to
Safeway customers without reviewing, supervising, correcting, and/or determining
whether or not the said literature was accurate and contained all warnings that
should have been given to customers when the said drug was dispensed . . . .”
However, this allegation does not reflect the record before us on summary
judgment. Safeway contracted with PDX to use the abbreviated monograph. If
anything, this was as a means to save money or employee time. But this decision
was, at most, a contributing factor to the failure of Safeway to provide Hardin
adequate warnings when her prescriptions were filled by Safeway pharmacies.
This resulting failure to warn Hardin of the dangers associated with Lamotrigine
cannot be fairly characterized as anything other than professional negligence.
A defendant’s actions towards a plaintiff are measured by one standard of
care, even if the plaintiff attempts to articulate multiple theories of liability.
(Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992,
995, 998 [pleadings stated causes of action for both ordinary and professional
negligence, where a patient fell off a gurney that did not have its rails raised,
reversed because a defendant is only subject to a single standard of care.].) In
Bellamy v. Appellate Department (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 797 a patient fell when
she was left unattended and unsecured on an X-ray table. The hospital claimed
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that the action was barred by the limitations period for personal injury. (Id. at
799.) The court of appeal, however, held that the complaint alleged professional
negligence, bringing it within the purview of MICRA because the fall occurred in
the course of the hospital’s rendering professional services. (Id. at 806.) The
hospital’s professional duty encompassed mundane acts such as securing the
patient while on the x-ray table. So too, here.
Safeway cites persuasive authority, Taylor v. United States (9th Cir. 1987)
821 F.2d 1428, interpreting California law. There a hospital patient suffered
permanent brain damage when his ventilator was disconnected for an undisclosed
reason. The Ninth Circuit determined that MICRA applied even if the ventilator
was disconnected as a result of such non-treatment-related causes as a janitor
bumping a broom into the patient’s bed. (Id. at 1432.) It was the hospital’s
professional duty to prevent the patient from becoming separated from the
ventilator, and that duty was breached regardless of the reason the ventilator
detached from the patient.
The Hardins rely on So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, and Atienza v.
Taub (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 388, to argue that conduct furthering a health care
provider’s self-interest, such as Safeway’s profit motive here, does not fall within
the scope of rendering professional services. Both cases are readily distinguishable
from this one. In So, an angry doctor was sued after she tried to intimidate a
patient by shoving a vial containing the patient’s blood and tissue at her, and then
demanded that the patient not tell anyone about it. The patient sued for negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery. In these
circumstances, the appellate court held the doctor was being sued for acts that were
outside the scope of rendering professional services. Thus, her complaint was not
time barred under section 340.5. (So v. Shin, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 662–
673.)
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In Atienza v. Taub, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 388, a patient sued a doctor after
she had an illicit affair with him. The court concluded she had no cause of action
for professional negligence where the facts demonstrated that the doctor’s
seduction of the patient had nothing to do with his rendering medical treatment.
Thus, in both cases relied upon by the Hardins the wrongdoing by health care
providers occurred outside the scope of the provision of professional services. The
Hardins’ claim against Safeway is different. Whatever may have been Safeway’s
motive in using the abbreviated monograph, the Hardins are suing Safeway for the
omission of information that should have been provided them when Safeway
dispensed the prescribed medication. In other words, Safeway is being sued for
deficiencies within the scope of its professional responsibilities as a pharmacy.
Thus, the allegations against Safeway all fall within MICRA’s purview.
Because the complaint alleges professional negligence against Safeway, it is
subject to the limitations period described in section 340.5, and is untimely for the
same reasons as the Hardins’ claims against the Medical Group and Jamieson.
CONCLUSION
Where “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could
reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue,” the accelerated Palma
procedure is appropriate. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; Palma,
supra 36 Cal.3d 171.) As the Hardins point out, “[t]hese petitions do not involve a
novel issue.” We agree. After applying long-established principles to undisputed
facts, the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue remanding this matter to the
respondent superior court and directing the superior court to vacate its orders
denying the summary judgment motions of petitioners Safeway, Inc., Palo Alto
Foundation Medical Group, and Sharon S. Jamieson, M.D., dated March 14, 2014,
and to issue new orders granting those motions.
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All parties shall bear their own costs.

_________________________
Siggins, J.

We concur:

_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.

_________________________
Pollak, J.
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